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This paper applies data analysis used in the major team sports to the 
Association of Tennis Professional (ATP). A linear regression model is used to 
determine the aspects of the professional tennis most relevant to player success. 
Special focus is given to the effect of a player’s overreliance on his serving 
performance. The available data (1991-2014) is divided into two periods in an 
effort to observe any differences between the era dominated by Pete Sampras 
and the era dominated by Roger Federer. The results from the former period 
indicate the same effect on player success of first and second serving and 
returning and an insignificant effect of reliance on success. Results from the 
latter period appear to show a greater importance for first serves and returns and 
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Baseball writer and historian Bill James is widely considered to be the 
pioneer in the use of empirical analysis of professional baseball, commonly 
referred to as sabermetrics. An avid lifelong fan, James began writing articles in 
the 1970s. This would lead to the self-publishing of an annual titled The Bill 
James Baseball Abstract. The book contains in-depth statistical analysis from 
James’s study of box scores. A key contribution by James mentioned in the book 
is the concept of runs created by hitters in baseball. As James notes: “A hitter’s 
job is to create runs for his team. A hitter is not at the plate attempting to compile 
a high batting average, or a high slugging average, or high total average, but 
rather to create runs for his team.”1 Billy Beane, general manager of the Oakland 
Athletics, piggybacked off this notion of needing offensive players to create runs 
to benefit his organization. The success of the Oakland Athletics in the early 
2000s with a relatively low payroll has led to a revolution in professional sports, 
spurred on by the release of Michael Lewis’s now-famous Moneyball.2 At the 
heart of Oakland’s good performances was the ability of Billy Beane to exploit 
inefficiencies in the labor market for professional baseball talent. As a result, 
Beane was able to acquire more on-the-field productivity for less money than his 
competitors. In essence, the Athletics were getting more bang for their buck. This 
allowed them to compete with big-spending clubs from larger markets, such as 
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the New York Yankees and Boston Red Sox. In 2001 and 2002 for example, 
Oakland had near the top records in Major League Baseball while having payrolls 
around half the league average. The A’s were consistently operating on the 
efficiency frontier, obtaining far higher winning percentages than others 
organizations in Major League Baseball with similar payrolls.3  
A key conclusions of Oakland’s analysis was the need to place emphasis 
on on-base percentage. Relative to other statistics, on-base percentage was 
being undervalued by MLB front offices, thus allowing room for exploitation by 
Billy Beane. The intuition behind Oakland’s findings is in fact remarkably simple. 
Getting on base leads to more opportunities to score runs, thus increasing the 
expected number of runs in a given inning, game, or season. For this reason, on-
base percentage is to be valued over some of the other metrics of offensive 
performance in baseball (like batting average, for example). By 2003, the rest of 
Major League Baseball had caught on.  
Analytics has been explored extensively in basketball as well. In his book, 
Basketball on Paper, Dean Oliver explores the best offenses and defenses in 
basketball. He begins by giving the reader a point of reference, noting that 
“average is boring, but you need to know what average is in order to define 
greatness.”4 Oliver is careful to mention the fact that average is a term relative to 
a team’s era. For example, an average offense in the NBA in 1974 would have 
been considered a bad offense in 1984. According to Oliver, we should “evaluate 
the teams of history against the averages of their times.” His research and 
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experience led him to four critical aspects of the game: shooting percentage from 
the field, getting offensive rebounds, committing turnovers, and going to the foul 
line a lot (and making the subsequent free throws). Teams who excel in these 
categories are the ones who achieve greatness. Conversely, a team who 
struggles in one of these categories better be able to make it up in the other 
categories, otherwise the team is likely to be bad. 
Today, analytics of this nature is commonplace in all of the major 
professional team sports. As a native Houstonian, I have seen in recent years 
what appears to be the positive effects of analytics for the Rockets of the 
National Basketball Association. Rockets’ general manager Daryl Morey is widely 
regarded as the NBA’s leading stats guy. I am hopeful Morey’s work will lead the 
Rockets to a championship title, something that has eluded Billy Beane and the 
Oakland A’s. 
Despite its widespread use in professional team sports, Moneyball-style 
analysis has gained less traction in individual sports. The reasons for the lack of 
an analytics movement in individual sports have become clearer recently.5 For 
one, being an individual sport makes it fundamentally different than baseball and 
basketball. In the early 2000s, Billy Beane successfully exploited labor market 
inefficiencies in order to stretch their limited payroll as far as possible. Beane had 
to assemble 25-man and 40-man rosters, not to mention the development of a 
strong farm system. This meant acquiring dozens of professional baseball 
players during the time frame for which the Athletics were ahead of the curve. 
4 
 
While a vibrant labor market exists for professional team sports, essentially no 
labor market exists in individual sports like golf and tennis. A key feature of the 
analytics movement is the ability to isolate an individual’s contribution to the 
team’s success. In tennis, there is nothing to isolate. We already know exactly 
what a player has contributed to his own on-court success. Additionally, a 
struggling tennis player cannot trade for or sign as a free agent a more 
competent one to play in his place. He is stuck with himself, with his only option 
being to improve his own skills. This leads me to the next reason why analytics 
may not have as great a demand in professional tennis. In professional North 
American sports, a large degree of parity exists. Since the turn of the millennium, 
fifteen seasons have produced nine different World Series champions in the 30-
team Major League Baseball. Furthermore, the highest team winning percentage 
during this time period was .716,6 when the 2001 Seattle Mariners won an 
unusually high 116 regular season games. The competitive balance in 
professional baseball allows for even small exploitation of market inefficiencies to 
result in noticeable differences in team performances. In stark contrast is a total 
lack of parity is professional men’s tennis. Over the past decade, nearly 90 
percent of the ATP’s four major tournaments have been won by one of three 
players: Roger Federer, Rafael Nadal, and Novak Djokovic. The total dominance 
by these top players makes it unlikely that any insights gained from 
comprehensive data analysis will allow players like John Isner or Gilles Simon to 
be regular contenders for major titles. In some respects, the best current use of 
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analytics in professional tennis comes in helping players determine which 
tournaments to enter. For players at the very top, the decision on which 
tournaments to play is fairly straightforward. However, players slightly further 
down in the world rankings often must decide between multiple events each 
week with varying amounts of rankings points and prize money available. The 
tradeoffs players face in these situations is simple enough. Bigger tournaments 
come with more prize money and more rankings points, yet also have a tougher 
field of competitors, meaning a player is more likely to be eliminated from the 
tournament in the earlier rounds. Conversely, players face less stiff competition 
in the smaller tournaments, but the rankings points and prize money earnings 
potential is much lower too. The analytics suggest that players are typically better 
off when they enter into the biggest tournament available to them. They realize 
higher expected payoffs in both rankings points and prize money.  
Despite its limitations, I still believe that analytics have the potential to 
have a meaningful impact in professional tennis. The knowledge a player can 
gain from analyzing the data has the ability to help enough to elevate him to a 
higher level. After all, the prize money available in the larger tournaments is quite 
significant, and if using analytics allows a player to win just one or two more big 
matches in a given year, the effect this would have on prize money and year-end 
ranking is enormous.  
I have been an avid follower of men’s professional tennis since the early 
2000s. My initial interest in the game coincided with the rise of Andy Roddick into 
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the upper echelons of the professional ranks. The sense of American pride I 
have has led me to great interest in international competitions such as the FIFA 
World Cup and the Olympics. For me, tennis has been no different. I thoroughly 
enjoyed watching Andy Roddick throughout his career play against the best from 
other nations. Of course, over the years I have gained a tremendous amount 
respect for the talents of the Roger Federer and Rafael Nadal. In my many years 
of observing the world’s top professional tennis players, the stark contrasts in 
playing style has been very clear. This made me wonder, are all styles of play 
created equal? Which are most effective? Or is raw tennis talent all that matters? 
These questions led me to reflect on a common refrain uttered by tennis 
commentators on television. On a regular basis over the years, I have heard 
television analysts say that the serve is the most important shot in the game of 
tennis. Additionally, according to tennis coach and author Frank Giampaolo, the 
“most glaring example of the game’s evolution is found in groundstrokes. It can 
be argued that the serve is still the most important shot and the greatest potential 
weapon, but the serve has not seen the metamorphosis that forehands and 
backhands have undergone over the past generation.”7 I would like to analyze 
the data to see if this really is the case. If not, what aspects of the game do have 
the greatest impact on player performance? Is it possible that a certain skill is 
undervalued at the professional level? If in fact it is possible for a player to 
determine which aspects of the game (serve, groundstrokes, return, etc.) have 
the largest impact on winning tennis matches and which skills are undervalued, 
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he would find himself in a situation similar to that of the Oakland Athletics in the 
early 2000s. He would be equipped with more information than his opponents, 
thus able to use his practice time most efficiently. That is to say, he could budget 
a greater amount of his time practicing to areas of the game of tennis that will 
have the largest impact on winning tennis matches.  
Tennis has become a very lucrative sport. Roger Federer, a player many 
consider to be the greatest of all-time, has earned $88.6 million in prize money in 
his career as of the end of the 2014 season. The difference in prize money 
between winning a tournament and finishing in second place can be huge. To put 
things into perspective, in the 2014 US Open, one of the year’s four major 
tournaments, the winner took home $3 million while second place received $1.45 
million. Semifinalists received $730,000 and quarterfinalists received $370,250. 
One can easily see the difference a win or a loss in a single match can make. If a 
player can gain a slight edge using statistical analysis, he could potentially walk 













Of all the professional sports in America, it comes as no surprise to me 
that baseball was the first to experience a revolution in statistical analysis. Apart 
from being the nation’s most popular sport for decades, baseball statistics have 
been tracked with incredible accuracy for quite a long time. Because of the large 
amounts of readily available baseball data, the sport has lent itself to rigorous 
analysis by statisticians and economists alike. Furthermore, the nature of the 
game of baseball is such that it is easier to differentiate the effects of individual 
players on a given team’s performance. In American football for example, it is 
difficult to quantify the positive effects of good blocking by offensive lineman or 
effective clogging of running lanes by a good defensive nose tackle like Vince 
Wilfork. Likewise, calculating the positive effects on team performance in soccer 
can be challenging for players who do not contribute much directly to scoring 
goals, although innovation in collecting data on professional soccer matches 
could one day solve this problem. But as things stand today, it is difficult to 
quantify the effect a defensive midfielder like Kyle Beckerman has on the 
performance of Real Salt Lake, although the intuition of a soccer fan would say 
that his presence in the lineup has a tremendous impact on that team’s success. 
As far as professional tennis is concerned though, I believe it shares more 
similarities with baseball than it does with American football and soccer. For one, 
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the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP), the world’s governing body for 
men’s professional tennis, compiles good data for the matches it sanctions, and 
this data is available to the public (Note: all stats and figures I cite have been 
pulled directly for the ATP’s website, with the exception of information for which I 
specifically have cited another source).8 In addition to having quality data, tennis 
is played in either singles or doubles. In this paper, my analysis will focus on ATP 
singles matches, so I will obviously not have an issue with conflating effects of 
different players within a team on that team’s performance. 
 Because tennis does not have the large following that the major team 
sports do in America, I feel that I should give a brief overview of the structure of a 
tennis match. A point starts with serve. A serve which the opponent is unable to 
contact is called an ace. The server has two opportunities to make the serve into 
the diagonal service box. If he is unsuccessful in either attempt, he loses the 
point (missing both serves is called a double fault). Generally speaking, a point 
will end when the ball is hit into the net, lands outside of the court of play, or 
bounces twice. Although tennis has an odd scoring system (love, 15, 30, 40, 
deuce), in practice a game is won by the player who is first to reach four points, 
while winning by at least two points. The two players alternate serving between 
games. A set is won by the first player to win six games, but must also win by at 
least two games. A set can be won by any of the following scores: 6-0, 6-1, 6-2, 
6-3, 6-4, 7-5, 7-6. The score of 7-6 is the one that stands out of the group 
because it seems to violate the requirement of winning by at least two games. If 
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a set is tied with each player having won six games, it goes to a tiebreaker. In a 
tiebreaker, players alternate serving after odd-numbered points. It is over when 
one player reaches seven points, winning by at least two points. The match is 
won by the player winning two out of three sets, with a few exceptions. In the four 
major tournaments (Australian Open, French Open, Wimbledon, and US Open) 
and a few others, matches are best-of-five sets. 
 My dataset has been compiled from the ATP’s website using a variety of 
metrics published by the organization. The ATP has listed these statistics for 
each of the top 200 players in the year-end rankings, dating back to 1991. As an 
avid follower of tennis and its history, I have reason to believe the general style of 
play has changed since 1991. For this reason, I have chosen divide and compare 
the two periods. While the year 2002 may seem arbitrary, it closely approximates 
the beginning of the era of Roger Federer and the end of the era of Pete 
Sampras. It is the beginning of what I view as the most modern era of 








Thus, my initial dataset will include year-end results from 2002 to 2014. When 
sifting through the ATP’s data, I realized that I would not be able to use all of the 
two hundred observations for each year. Because a player’s ranking in any given 
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year is largely a function of his ranking the previous year, many players in the 
dataset remained in the top 200 in the world rankings who did not play enough 
matches in the year to do any sort of meaningful analysis. To give a hypothetical 
example, a player could have finished 2005 ranked 40th in the world. During the 
offseason, this hypothetical player could have sustained an injury which caused 
him to miss the bulk of the 2006 season. As a result, he may have only played in 
a half-dozen matches in 2006. Despite playing a limited number of matches, this 
player would be likely to finish in the top 200 of the 2006 year-end rankings. 
Additionally, it is also possible there could be an up-and-coming young player 
who reaches the top 200 in the world rankings while playing relatively few 
matches. Now it is obvious to me that these players need to be left out of the 
analysis. A player who participates in less than ten, or even less than twenty 
matches in a given year is much more likely to display match statistics that are 
the result of chance, rather than being truly indicative of the player’s ability. By 
observing the data, I have judged it to be best to narrow my analysis to the top 
50 players of each year’s year-end rankings from 1991 to 2014. The 
overwhelming majority of the players who finished a year in the top 50 of the 
world rankings played at least 40 matches, with some playing as many as 100. 
My hope is that this will constitute enough matches to give nonrandom results, so 






OVERVIEW OF THE ANALYSIS 
 
 
I am looking to analyze my data by creating a model which relates a 
player’s success to his skill level in various aspects of the game of tennis. I will 
divide the game into three skill categories: serving, returning, and court play. The 
last of these consists of both groundstrokes and net game. For determining a 
measure of success, my initial inclination was to use year-end rankings. 
However, this created a bit of a problem for me. First of all, the year-end ranking 
for the current year is largely a function of the year-end ranking of previous year. 
Furthermore, the formula used by the ATP for determining rankings is not made 
known to the public, and certain tournaments are weighted more heavily than 
others. My second thought was to use total wins for the year as my measure of 
success. But again, this approach has some obvious problems. Unlike team 
sports, there is no set schedule for professional tennis players. The Houston 
Astros are required to play 162 games during the season, unless of course they 
want to forfeit a game and have it recorded as a loss. They have no choice in the 
matter. On the other hand, professional tennis players have a choice as to which 
tournaments they enter. It is not uncommon to see star players sit out a 
tournament or two to rest as a part of their preparation for bigger tournaments. In 
addition, the nature of professional tennis tournaments lends itself to large 
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discrepancies in total matches played amongst different players. As far as I am 
aware, all ATP-sanctioned tournaments are single-elimination. Many have either 
64 or 128 entrants and have a bracket format similar to that of NCAA March 
Madness. Once a player loses a match, he is out of the tournament bracket. 
Because of this, one would expect for the very top players to play more matches 
over the course of the year than the less elite players, since the highest-ranking 
players are the individuals most likely to advance the furthest into tournaments. 
  For the reasons stated above, I ultimately decided to use winning 
percentage as my measure of player success and dependent variable for my 
regressions. Due to large differences in matches played, simply counting wins 
and losses will not make for good analysis. The same logic will apply to my 
measures of skill. Counting aces over the course of the year will not be a good 
measure of serving skill, but an aces per match statistic could possibly function 
as a good measure of serving skill. All stats used for my analysis will be rate 
stats, not counting stats. In Stata, I will be regressing player winning percentage 
on serving skill, returning skill, and court play skill. Now since there is no one 
metric to quantify these skills, I will run a number of regressions in an attempt to 
find the best proxies with the data that is available to me. Below I list the 
available stats by category. 
 
Serving statistics:  
 aces per match 
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 double faults per match 
 percentage of first serves made 
 percentage of first serve points won 
 percentage of second serve points won 
 percentage of serve games won 
 percentage of break points saved 
 
Returning statistics: 
 percentage of first serve return points won 
 percentage of second serve return points won 
 percentage of break points won 
 percentage of return games won 
 
Other: 
 winning percentage 
 percentage of tiebreakers won 
 tiebreakers played per match 
 
  Notably absent from this list is any potential measure of court play skill. 
Despite the fact the ATP compiles excellent data, it does not have available 
information regarding groundstrokes and net play. Because I believe it is 
necessary to control for court play skill in my model in order to avoid omitted 
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variable bias, this lack of data presents a major problem for me. Therefore, I 
have created a statistic which I will call serve reliance. In my experience watching 
professional tennis, generally speaking, players with “big serves” hit many aces, 
don’t often break their opponent’s serve, play lots of tiebreakers, and most 
importantly, have weaker ground and net games, all else being equal. Although 
this is just anecdotal evidence, a few players immediately come to mind. This 
could be said about Andy Roddick, as he is most known for his big serve ability, 
and had weaker court play than other top 5 players when he was in his prime. 
The success of Roddick on any given day was heavily reliant on a good serving 
performance. But there are two other players whom I believe this concept is even 
more applicable. American John Isner and Croatian Ivo Karlovic are two 
extremely tall tennis players (6 ft. 10 in. and 6 ft. 11 in. respectively) who are 
known for enormous serve games and limited court mobility. Over the course of 
their careers, Isner has won just 11% of his return games, while Karlovic has won 
just 9% of his return games. To put this into perspective, Federer, Nadal, and 
Djokovic have won 27%, 33%, and 32% of their career return games.  
  I will calculate serve reliance by dividing tiebreakers played per match by 
the percentage of return games won. Players with a higher value for serve 
reliance will be considered to be more reliant on good serving performances 
relative to other players. When running my regressions, I expect the coefficient 
on this variable to be negative because I believe players who depend heavily on 
the performance of their serve will realize worse performances over the course of 
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a given year than their peers who display similar characteristics in all other 
categories. The reasoning for my expectations is that I believe players will want 
to diversify their talent in a way much like investors want to diversify stocks. 
Players will want to be highly-skilled in many areas so they have a plan B or plan 
C if their go-to skill is not as effective for one reason or another in any one match. 
James Harden is a good example of this concept in professional basketball. If 
Harden is having an off-shooting night, his uncanny ability to draw fouls and get 
to the free throw line makes him able to compensate for his poor shooting. To 
bring it back to Isner and Karlovic, I get the sense that these two players do not 
have the same luxury. If their big serves happen to be neutralized by a good 
returner, their chances of winning that particular match are greatly diminished. 
There is one more thing regarding serve reliance that I need to note. Initially, I 
planned on calculating serve reliance by adding tiebreakers played per match 
and aces per match, then dividing the sum by percentage of return games won. I 
opted against this way of calculating the statistic because I did not want to 
overestimate the dependence on a quality serving performance for those players 
that hit a relatively high number of aces but also have good return games. 
In order to simplify the analysis and to assure the reader I have accounted 
and controlled for all necessary factors, I am making the following assumptions: 
 Aces and double faults are independent of the quality of the opponent. 
Since the serve is the first shot of the point, I believe that these stats will 
remain consistent for a given player across the entire spectrum of 
18 
 
opponent talent. I realize in theory it is possible for this not to be the case. 
For example, if a player knows his opponent is an exceptionally good 
returner, he might take more risks on his serve in order to neutralize the 
strength of his opponent. This would seemingly lead to more aces and 
double faults. Given the data and nature of this paper, I am unable to 
compare aces and double faults for individual players while controlling for 
opponent quality. In order to do so, I would have to look at the match 
report for every single match for every single player for the past 13 years. 
This information is not readily available, thus I chose to make the above 
assumption. 
 While I am assuming aces and double faults are independent of the 
opponent’s skill level, the rest of the statistics are not likely to be 
independent of the quality of the opponent. All else being equal, playing 
against a good server will cause a player to win a smaller percentage of 
points and games as a returner. The reverse is also true. Playing a quality 
returner means the serve will be less effective than when playing against 
an average or mediocre returner. This makes it necessary for my model to 
control for the skill level of the player’s opponents when predicting his 
year-end winning percentage. My assumption is that the quality of the 
opponents played will be reflected in the serving and returning skills 
statistics and the year-end winning percentage. For a given match, playing 
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against a highly-skilled opponent will in general result in reduced skill 
stats, and in turn result in a greater probability of losing that match. 
 Professional tennis tournaments are played primarily on one of three 
surfaces: hard courts, clay courts, and grass courts. Additionally, there are 
some matches played on indoor carpet courts contained in my dataset. 
The casual tennis fan will easily be able to recognize the fact that some 
players excel on a particular surface. The obvious example is Rafael 
Nadal when playing on clay courts. Nadal will go down in history as one of 
the greatest tennis players of all-time. He has achieved success on every 
surface, having won the Career Grand Slam (winning each of the four 
major tournaments). But of note is his record nine career victories at the 
French Open, the one major tournament played on clay. A similar point 
can be made about Roger Federer’s success on grass courts. He too has 
won the Career Grand Slam, and a record 17 total major tournament titles. 
His success on grass courts stands out most, winning seven times at 
Wimbledon (the one major tournament played on grass), a record he 
shares with Pete Sampras. Just like in my above assumption regarding 
the quality of the opponent, I am assuming that a player’s dominance on a 
particular surface will be reflected in the skill stats and winning 
percentage. To give an example, Nadal has won 43% of his career return 
games on clay courts, which is a staggeringly high figure. By comparison, 
he has won 27% of his return games on all other surfaces. Similar trends 
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can be seen in other statistical categories for Nadal (see his player profile 
on www.atpworldtour.com). But Nadal’s dominant skills on clay courts are 
reflected in his winning percentage. He was won 93% of his career 
matches on clay, compared to 77% of career matches played on all other 
surfaces. By this line of reasoning, I do not feel the need to explicitly 
control for the court surface in my model for predicting year-end winning 
percentage. 
     
I am tempted to make the assumption that tiebreakers, since they are simply a 
microcosm of a set and match, will be won at higher rates by those players who 
win matches at higher rates. But I think it is also possible that tiebreaker 
performance is more related to serving skill. Therefore, I will resist the urge to 
make any assumptions about tiebreakers. Furthermore, because tiebreaker win-
loss records are available in my dataset, I will be able to test empirically the 














Before running regressions in Stata, I wanted to view the summary 
statistics of my dataset to get an idea what kind of numbers I was working with. 
For clarity, here is a list of the variable names with their corresponding skill 
statistics: 
 winpct: percentage of matches won  
 tbrkmtch: tiebreakers played per match 
 acemtch: aces per match 
 reliance: serve reliance 
 onesrvpct: percentage of first serves made 
 onesrvwon: percentage of points won when making the first serve 
 twosrvwon: percentage of points won when making the second serve 
 oneretwon: percentage of points won when the opponent makes the first 
serve 
 tworetwon: percentage of points won when the opponent makes the 
second serve 
 retgamewon: percentage of return games won 
 srvgamewon: percentage of serve games won 




When observing the summary statistics (Table 1), I found it somewhat interesting 
that some of the skill statistics had rather large spreads, while others had 
relatively low spreads. Winning percentages in my dataset seem to be fairly 
spread out, with a high of 95% and a low around 37%. The sample mean was 
61%. This is different from what we see in the team sports, where we expect the 
average winning percentage to be no more or no less than 50%. However, I am 
not at all surprised to see the average winning percentage for my sample to be 
above 50%. Because my analysis is restricted to the top 50 players in the year-
end rankings, many of the matches played by players in the dataset were played 
against players not in the dataset. Additionally, since the players in the dataset 
are ranked higher than players not in the dataset, it should not be shocking that 
the higher ranked players win the majority of these matches, resulting in the 61% 
figure present in the summary statistics. The standard deviation for my sample 
was around 0.1, meaning about 95% of the player year-end winning percentages 
from the years 2002 to 2014 fell between 40% and 80%. Again, this result is not 
one I find to be surprising. Somewhat more interesting is the initial information I 
found regarding tiebreakers. Like winning percentages, the two tiebreaker 
metrics in my dataset were had fairly large spreads. For tiebreakers played per 
match, the range was from 0.17 to 1.1. Averaging more than a tiebreaker per 
match, when most matches are best two out of three sets, is incredibly high. I 
was also did not expect to find any observations with less than one tiebreaker 
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played every five matches on average. Tiebreaker winning percentage and the 
serve reliance statistic I constructed also had relatively large variances. As I had 
anticipated from years of viewing professional tennis, there existed a large gap 
between the highest and lowest aces per match (20.6 vs. 0.6). The same could 
not be said of the remaining measures of serving skill, and the measures of 
returning skill, which all had less spread out observations. 
 I started a more complete analysis of the 1991-2001 data by observing the 
summary statistics from that period (Table 1). Upon an initial look at the 
numbers, the data appears to be awfully similar to the data from the 2002-2014 
period. As a percentage of the sample mean from the more recent period, the 
sample means for ten of the twelve skill metrics in my dataset for 1991-2001 are 
nearly the same. The two exceptions are aces per match and the serve reliance 
metric I devised. From the former period to the latter, these two statistics saw 
their means increase by 17.7% and 22.8% respectively. This could potentially 
suggest a change in the relevance of these metrics over time, something which 
will be evaluated in my regression analysis of the former period. The most 
striking observation to be made when viewing this period’s summary statistics 
has to do with standard deviations of the metrics in the dataset. Nine of the 
twelve statistics in the sample have smaller standard deviations in the period that 
includes the 1990s than the period that includes the most recent years of 
professional tennis data. My first instinct tells me that this could be an indication 
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of a widening gap between the very best players and the remaining athletes in 
the world’s top 50, although other explanations could exist. 
(Table 1) 
 
When I began researching this topic, I expected to have a model in which 
success (winning percentage) was a function of serving skill, returning skill, and 
court play skill. Some of my initial findings have caused me to reevaluate this 
model, and make an addition. Earlier, I noted that I was resisting the urge to 
make any assumptions about tiebreakers. Because they are simply a microcosm 
of the match as a whole, it seems intuitive to think that the best players who win 
a high percentage of their matches would be the same players who win a high 
percentage of their tiebreakers. As it turns out, this statement is not entirely true. 
While match and tiebreaker winning percentages do move together, the two 
metrics only have a moderately positive correlation (Figure 2). 
mean std. dev. min max mean std. dev. min max
winpct 0.601 0.101 0.367 0.953 0.613 0.087 0.407 0.923
tbrkmtch 0.447 0.137 0.170 1.100 0.414 0.115 0.050 1.120
acemtch 6.309 3.097 0.600 20.600 5.361 2.860 0.800 15.700
reliance 2.057 1.312 0.540 12.050 1.675 0.762 0.200 8.620
onesrvpct 0.609 0.044 0.500 0.740 0.590 0.049 0.460 0.780
onesrvwon 0.728 0.039 0.610 0.850 0.724 0.048 0.600 0.860
twosrvwon 0.522 0.025 0.450 0.600 0.507 0.022 0.440 0.570
oneretwon 0.305 0.031 0.210 0.450 0.304 0.026 0.220 0.380
tworetwon 0.505 0.030 0.400 0.610 0.519 0.025 0.430 0.600
retgamewon 0.242 0.050 0.090 0.390 0.263 0.044 0.130 0.390
srvgamewon 0.808 0.048 0.650 0.940 0.790 0.049 0.650 0.920
tbrkpct 0.537 0.113 0.000 0.857 0.539 0.106 0.150 1.000
2002-2014




Just like for the latter period, I wanted to look closer at the tiebreaker 
winning percentage before making any assumptions about their impact (or lack 
thereof) on overall player success (year-end winning percentage) in the 1991-
2001 period. Like in my previous analysis, I find that in the chronologically earlier 
data, winning percentage and tiebreaker winning percentage move together 
(Figure 2). However, an even weaker correlation between the two exists than it 
did for the more recent data. Because of this I once again, despite tiebreakers 
simply being a microcosm of the tennis match as a whole, feel compelled to have 
a model which makes year-end winning percentage a function of serving skill, 





  (Figure 2) 
 
 So while it may be true to say that in general top players perform well in 
tiebreakers, it would not be wise to say overall match success is a good predictor 
of success in tiebreakers. This leads me to believe that tiebreaker performance, 
in and of itself, is a skill. For this reason, I chose to alter my model to include 
tiebreaker skill, which is proxied by year-end tiebreaker winning percentage. 
 
1 2 1 2
1. winpct 1.000 0.399 1.000 0.282








Professional tennis looks much different today than it did fifty or a hundred 
years ago. I believe much of this can be attributed to significant advances in 
racket technology.9 Throughout much of the sport’s history, rackets were made 
out of laminated wood. The 1960s saw the introduction of steel and aluminum 
racket frames. By the early 1980s, graphite composites and other materials 
began to be used by racket producing companies. While composite racket 
frames are still the standard today, their quality has continued to improve greatly 
over the last three and a half decades. This gives me reason to believe it is 
possible that the skills with the greatest impact on winning percentage in the 
most recent years may not be the same skills that have always been most 
important for player success. When looking at the serve reliance statistic for the 
entire dataset (from 1991 to 2014), a noticeable trend emerges (Figure 3). 
Although a few outlier years exists, the average serve reliance for the top 50 
players in each year’s rankings has drifted steadily upward, from less than one 







 (Figure 3) 
 
I wanted to start my statistical analysis by looking at the obvious. It seems 
reasonable to say that players who win large percentages of their serve games, 
return games, and tiebreakers win large percentages of their matches. After all, 
doing so leads a player directly to victory. When using percentage of serve 
games won, percentage of return games won, and percentage of tiebreakers 
won, I find that all three have positive and statistically significant effects on year-
end match winning percentage, and the model has a fairly large R-squared value 
(Table 2). As I would have expected, the coefficients for serve and return games 
won were much larger than the coefficient on tiebreakers (about ten times as 
great). This makes sense, at least in part, because players are guaranteed at 
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least three serve and three return games per set, while the overwhelming 
majority of players average less than one tiebreaker per match. Although the 
magnitude of the effects of serve and return games were close, the coefficient on 
percentage of return games won is slightly higher. On average, a player who 
increases his percentage of serve games won by one percentage point will 
increase his winning percentage by 1.7 percentage points, whereas the expected 
effect of increasing percentage of return games won by one percentage point is a 
1.5 percentage point increase in winning percentage. I feel the best way to look 
for significant differences between the two periods is to run the same regressions 
for the 1991-2001 period that I do for the most recent data. I ran the same initial 
regression I did for the 2002-2014 period (Table 2). The results from this 
regression are very similar to those of the other period. All three independent 
variables are still highly statistically significant and have positive coefficients of 



































When adding serve reliance (Table 3) to this first model in order to control 
for the quality of a player’s court game, I find that its coefficient is statistically and 
economically insignificant. As one could imagine, the addition of serve reliance, 
due to its insignificance, resulted in only the slightest of upticks in the adjusted R-
squared value from the model for which it was omitted. Adding my serve reliance 
statistic to my model for the 1991-2001 period to control for the quality of a 
player’s court game yields nearly identical results to when I first added it to my 
model for the 2002-2014 dataset (Table 3). I find that serve reliance is 
economically and statistically insignificant, in addition to have the opposite sign 












































Although the variables used above explain a great deal of the variation in 
year-end winning percentage, they do not explain much in any practical sense. 
Of course winning more serve and return games helps a player win matches. 
That much is obvious. But it does not help a player to narrow down which specific 
skills are doing the most to help win matches. So in an attempt to address this 
dilemma, I chose to break up serving and returning skills into a few different 
categories. After breaking up the serving and return skills, I found that aces per 
match was a statistically insignificant metric for serving skill in both periods 
(Table 4). It was the case that every regression I ran that included aces per 
match gave me the result that the metric was insignificant, including regressions 
for which I use White standard errors to correct for any issues with 
heteroscedasticity. While I was not necessarily expecting this, I cannot say that I 
am altogether surprised at this finding. Because of limitations in my dataset, I am 
unable to net out aces from the percentage of first serve points won statistic. If I 
were able to do so, it is quite possible that aces would have a statistically 
significant effect on winning percentage. However, it is also possible that netting 
out aces would not lead to a statistically significant effect on winning percentage. 
From watching professional tennis, my gut tells me that aces and overall serving 
skill are correlated, but sheer volume of aces alone is probably not a good 
indicator of overall serving skill. Most aces come on first serves, so it is plausible 
that a player could have an above average first serve (and hit a high number of 
aces), yet have a mediocre second serve, which could result in just so-so overall 
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serving skill. Because I continually found aces per match to be statistically 
insignificant, and I did not want to inflate the standard errors for any of my other 

















  (Table 4) 
   
            















Robust standard errors in parentheses.
-2.160 -2.628
(0.124) (0.092)





















I then chose to use percentage of first and second serve points won as my 
measures of serving skill and percentage of first and second serve return points 
won as my measures of returning skill, controlling for court play and tiebreaker 
skills. The results show that all estimators are statistically significant and have 
the signs I would have expected (all are positive except for a negative sign on 
serve reliance). Lastly, I included percentage of first serves made in my model 
(Table 5). I was somewhat surprised to find this variable had a statistically and 
economically significant effect on year-end winning percentage. However, it does 
make sense that forcing your opponent to return more first serves will lead to 
better outcomes, provided the quality of the first serve is held constant. 
Therefore, I consider this final model to be my best model. I was interested to 
see the results of my final model for the former period indicate, that despite 
having the expected negative sign, the estimator for serve reliance was 
economically and statistically insignificant, again including when robust standard 
errors are used (Table 5). This result would appear to indicate that overreliance 
on good serving performances has a negative impact on a player’s success in 
the most recent time period, while not having a consequential effect on 


















 (Table 5) 
 
Because of its relevance to the real world implications of my analysis, I 
performed an F-test to see if my coefficients are statistically different from one 
another. I find that they are for the 2002-2014 period. If my model is to be 
trusted, I can conclude that first serve skill has a greater impact on winning than 
second serve skill, and second return skill has a greater impact on winning than 
first return skill for this period (Figure 4). Doing the same F-test for the 1991-2001 
period I believe led to the most interesting result that reveals a significant 
distinction between the two periods. The coefficients on percentage of first serve 

























R-squared = 0.726 R-squared = 0.746






from one another (Figure 4). This means that an improvement in first serve skill 
does not have a larger impact on winning percentage than a proportional 
improvement in second serve skill, which was found in the data for the latter 
period. The same can be said for the coefficients on percentage of first serve 
return points won and percentage of second serve return points won. While in the 
more recent years, second serve return skill had a larger impact on a player’s 
success, the impact of the first and second serve return skill are statistically the 
same in the earlier years. This could possibly be an indication that there may 
exist a single, better and more inclusive metric for each of the two skills (serve 






  (Figure 4) 
















Prob > F = 0.0002 Prob > F = 0.6089
2002-2014 1991-2001
onesrvwon=twosrvwon







Given the limited amount of research done until now in analytics for 
professional tennis, it is my belief that there exists enormous potential for more 
work in this field. Although numbers gurus will always be valuable for the purpose 
of moving knowledge forward, Daryl Morey notes that “the age of the 
irreplaceable analyst no longer exists, if it ever did.”10 According to the general 
manager of the Houston Rockets, the way to better analysis is better data.  
“Raw numbers, not the people and programs that attempt to make sense 
of them. Many organizations have spent the last few years hiring top 
analysts based on the belief that they create differentiation. Smart 
companies such as Google believe they need savants to crunch those 
numbers and find the connections that regular humans could not. But my 
experience, and what I’m hearing from more organizations (sports and 
non), shows that real advantage comes from unique data that no one else 
has.” 
Morey goes on the give a relevant example as it relates to the NBA: 
“Many teams in the NBA track data for their own team such as how often a 
player on defense challenges shots. When tracked for your own team, this 
information can be useful to add accountability to the important things a 
36 
 
coach is trying to emphasize to win games and to improve players on the 
margin by increasing their effort on challenging shots. The data does not 
offer significant competitive leverage, however, until you track the data for 
the entire league. Only with the league-wide data can you tell if your 
players are creating an advantage relative to others in the league on shot 
challenges (higher leverage) or even more important, identify players you 
may want to acquire who challenge shots extremely well (highest 
leverage). Without the context of the entire league, it is very hard to use 
data in any meaningfully competitive way. Tracking data for the whole 
league across multiple dimensions is a significant task but very worth it. 
For obvious reasons, I cannot reveal what data the Houston Rockets track 
but to track the significant data we gather we use a very large set of 
temporary labor that helps us develop these data sets that we hope will 
create an advantage over time. To be sure, you need strong analysts (and 
we have many) to then work with this data, but the leverage comes not 
from the analysis but from having the data that others do not.” 
As I briefly mentioned earlier, it did not take long for the rest of Major League 
Baseball to catch up to the Oakland A’s. Once the high revenue teams, such as 
the Boston Red Sox and New York Yankees, found out what was going on in 
Oakland, they too hired smart analysts, and Oakland’s advantage quickly eroded. 
They only way for Oakland to achieve sustained success with its limited payroll 
would have been to obtain better data than any of its competitors. 
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  The most likely place from which better data will come in professional 
tennis is via Hawk-Eye technology.11 Developed by Dr. Paul Hawkins in the 
United Kingdom, the technology was first used for cricket in the early 2000s, but 
is now used in a variety of professional sports (including tennis, soccer, and 
Australian rules football). The technology works by employing the principles of 
triangulation and a number of high-speed cameras (ten in professional tennis) to 
track the path of the ball. The graphics produced by the system allow for 
information to be provided to judges and officials, television viewers, and 
coaches almost instantaneously. Although the technology is not perfect, it is able 
to judge the location of the ball with a fair amount of precision, having a margin of 
error of just 5 millimeters. 
The Hawk-Eye technology has been used for quite some time now to 
analyze individual matches, particularly important matches with large television 
viewership in the major tournaments. For example, BBC Sport has an in-depth 
analysis of the 2005 Wimbledon men’s singles final in which Roger Federer 
defeated Andy Roddick 6-2, 7-6 (7-2), 6-4.12 The data indicates that both Federer 
and Roddick attempted a fairly even mix of first serves to their opponent’s 
backhand and forehand sides (Table 6). However, on second serve attempts, 
both players primarily attack their opponent's backhand side (which would be 
considered the norm in professional tennis). Data from player third shots within a 
rally (Figures 5a and 5b) seems to suggest that Roddick was somewhat more 
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aggressive in his attempt to get to the net to hit volleys (42 approach shots), 















(Figure 5a)     (Figure 5b) 
 
 
At this juncture, the Hawk-Eye technology is not able to be used for 
comprehensive analysis. In order to use it in a manner similar to which I did for 
the rest of my paper, the information would need to be available for all matches 
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involving all of the top professional players. While some interesting analysis of 
individual matches has been done, complete datasets are necessary to make 
meaningful inferences about winning percentage. If and when these datasets are 
compiled, my instincts as a player and fan tell me that the information regarding 
serve and groundstroke court depth will be most relevant. For a given point, 
playing the ball deeper in the service box for a serve and deeper in the court for a 
groundstroke means that the opponent is more likely to be in a defensive position 
and therefore less likely to win the point. It seems reasonable to assume that 
players with deeper average serve and shot depth are more frequently putting 
their opponents in defensive positions and more likely to be successful over the 
course of a year’s worth of matches. Although less certain, I also think the arc of 
a player’s groundstrokes could potentially play a role in year-end winning 
percentage. Shots hit with larger amounts of topspin tend to travel in more of an 
arched trajectory while shots with less topspin travel in a relatively flat trajectory. 
The Hawk-Eye technology is capable to giving this information. My experience 
tells me that shots with heavy topspin (like Nadal’s forehand) are more difficult to 
deal with as a player. It is possible that greater average shot arc leads to greater 
winning percentages. 
Academic research on mixed strategy equilibrium also gives some idea of 
which direction future tennis analysis could go given complete Hawk-Eye 
datasets. Chiappori, Levitt, and Groseclose tested mixed strategy equilibria in 
game theory by studying penalty kicks in professional soccer.13 Their data from 
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the major leagues in Europe made for good analysis because incentives are 
properly aligned. The top leagues in Europe are the best in the world. Millions of 
dollars are at stake, giving players and coaches ample reason to invest the time 
necessary to fully understand the game, its strategies, and to choose optimally. 
In the game of penalty kicks, for all intents and purposes, the players move 
simultaneously. Kickers have the choice of kicking their natural side or opposite 
side, while goalkeepers have the choice to dive to their natural side or opposite. 
Given payoffs conditioned upon the strategies of other players, the authors 
conclude that the professional optimize in a way consistent with what the theory 
suggests. Walker and Wooders do similar analysis on serve data from 
Wimbledon.14 While they find that players do mix between serving to their 
opponent’s forehand and backhand side, doing a runs test reveals professional 
tennis players choose strategies inconsistent with the theory. There exists serial 
dependence in player serve strategies. As opposed to mixing strategies 
randomly, players too often alternate between serves to the opponent’s forehand 
and the opponent’s backhand. Given the fact that this information has been 
available now since the early 2000s, is it possible that players have corrected 
any inefficiencies in their serve strategies, and furthermore, do strategize 
optimally when it comes to hitting groundstrokes? 
I believe it could be possible that playing an unpredictable mix of heavily 
arched and flat shots will aid in success. Additionally, general tactics and 
strategic execution are vital to a player’s success.  Frank Giampaolo places an 
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emphasis on court positioning and shot selection. “Being in the right place at the 
right time to maximize success” and “executing patterns and plays at the 
appropriate time” are vital.7 The Hawk-eye technology has the ability to allow for 
in-depth exploration of optimal court positioning and shot selection strategies. 
Having more available data through Hawk-Eye will help to answer these 
questions and give players, coaches, and fans a better overall understanding of 
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